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Abstract: Having a confirmation bias sometimes leads us to hold inaccurate beliefs. So, the                           
puzzle goes: why do we have it? According to the influential argumentative theory of reasoning,                             
confirmation bias emerges because the primary function of reason is not to form accurate                           
beliefs, but to convince others that we’re right. A crucial prediction of the theory, then, is that                                 
confirmation bias should be found only in the reasoning domain. In this article, we argue that                               
there is evidence that confirmation bias does exist outside the reasoning domain. This                         
undermines the main evidential basis for the argumentative theory of reasoning. In presenting                         
the relevant evidence, we explore why having such confirmation bias may not be maladaptive. 
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 Confirmation bias without rhyme or reason 
 
Across a wide variety of experiments, subjects exhibit a ​confirmation bias​, “the seeking or                           
interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis                             
in hand” (Nickerson, 1998, p. 175). This bias is widespread, even among those who are                             
(supposed to be) searching for objective truths such as judges, scientists, and physicians                         
(Nickerson, 1998). At a social level, confirmation bias could lead to the aggregation of                           
like-minded individuals and group polarization, thus altering public debates (Sunstein, 2002;                     
Myers, 1982). 
As ubiquitous as it is, that we have a confirmation bias is somewhat bewildering. To                             
survive (and, all things considered, why not?), it is a good thing to acquire accurate beliefs and                                 
avoid holding inaccurate ones. But having a confirmation bias often leads us to hold inaccurate                             
beliefs, with potentially disastrous consequences down the road. So, here’s a puzzle: why do we                             
have a confirmation bias?  
One of the most influential responses to this challenge has been put forward by                           
proponents of the so-called “argumentative theory of reasoning” (Mercier and Sperber, 2011,                       
2017; Mercier, 2016; for other accounts, see e.g., Evans, 1989; Kunda, 1990; Stanovich, 2004). In                             
this article, our aim is to critically evaluate a central prediction of this theory.  
The argumentative theory of reasoning makes two central claims (Sperber & Mercier,                       
2011; Mercier, 2016). The first is about the ​nature ​ of reasoning. As Mercier (2016) notes:  
The vast bulk of cognition performs perceptual, motoric, and inferential functions without any                         
attention being paid to reasons. By contrast, reasoning ​evaluates reasons … and reasoning ​produces                           
reasons, whether in solitary ratiocination or in argumentation. (p. 690, our emphasis) 
Reasoning consists in ​evaluating and ​producing reasons. For the purpose of this article, we grant                             
that this characterization of the nature of reasoning is correct. It follows that a cognitive process                               
that is not engaged in either the evaluation or production of reasons is not a ​reasoning​ process. 
The second, central claim of the theory is about the ​function of reasoning. Here, the main                               
tenet of the argumentative theory is that the function of reasoning is not primarily to form                               
accurate beliefs, but to produce arguments to convince others (Mercier and Sperber, 2017).                         
Reasoning is for argumentation. And argumentation, in turn, is essential for efficient                       
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 communication and cooperation, as it allows to transmit messages without having to rely entirely                           
on trust (Mercier, 2016, p.690; Sperber et al. 2010). 
Mercier & Sperber (2017) hold that if argumentation is the function of reasoning, we                           
should expect it to be biased. In particular, we should expect reasoning to systematically work to                               
“find reasons for our ideas and against ideas we oppose” (Mercier & Sperber, 2017; p.218). They                               
write: 
When we produce reasons, we should be heavily biased towards our point of view. We’re not going                                 
to appear more rational by providing reasons why what we did was stupid; we’re not going to                                 
convince someone by giving them arguments for their point of view or against ours. This explains                               
an otherwise puzzling feature of reason: the myside bias. (p.73) 
Being biased leads one to find more arguments in favor of one’s view, as well as to                                 
counter-argue more effectively. This obviously has some benefits when it comes to convincing                         
others that one is right.  
The tendency to look for reasons in favor of our own ideas, and against ideas we                               
oppose, is what Mercier & Sperber call ​myside bias​. They avoid the term “confirmation bias”, as                               
it could convey the idea that subjects have a tendency to confirm ​any view they happen to                                 
entertain. As Sperber & Mercier (2019) write: “What they find difficult is not looking for                             
counterevidence or counterarguments in general, but only when what is being challenged is                         
their own opinion” (p.218). With this caveat in mind, in this article, we use ‘confirmation bias’                               
and ‘myside bias’ interchangeably. Accordingly, confirmation bias – or myside bias – is the                           
tendency to look for arguments and evidence in favor of one’s own beliefs, and to neglect                               
looking for arguments and evidence against one’s own beliefs. As defined by Nickerson                         
(1998), it is the “the seeking or interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial to existing                                 
beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in hand” (p. 175). 
A reasoning-based confirmation bias of this kind has been observed in multiple                       
studies (Nickerson, 1998; Mercier, 2016), and seems independent from general factors, like                       
intelligence (Stanovich & West, 2007). For instance, in the Wason selection task (Wason,                         
1968), once participants make an intuitive – and often wrong – judgment, they spend most of                               
their time thinking about the cards they have selected, and do not attempt to disconfirm their                               
intuitive decision (Ball et al. 2003; Lucas & Ball, 2005). As another example, in a study by Hall                                   
et al. (2012), participants had to answer a questionnaire about how strongly they agreed with a                               
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 set of moral principles. Following a sleight of hand performed by the experimenter, some of                             
the participants’ answers were inverted, such that their answers now indicated disagreement                       
with statements they previously agreed with, and vice versa. Not only did 69% of the                             
participants fail to detect at least one of the changes, but they also subsequently had a                               
tendency to justify views they thought they expressed – when in fact they reported agreeing                             
with the opposite views. In this case, merely making participants believe they held certain                           
views led them to look for arguments supporting views they previously reported disagreeing                         
with (For other cases, See Nickerson, 1998; Mercier, 2016). 
The argumentative theory of reasoning accounts for cases like these by holding that                         
the evolutionary ​function of reasoning is to convince others. If that’s the case, it is no surprise                                 
that subjects mainly look for arguments in favor of their own views: confirmation bias is a                               
feature of reasoning, not a bug. 
One of the most central predictions of the theory naturally follows, in Mercier &                           
Sperber’s words: “If it were shown that the myside bias [or confirmation bias] is widespread in                               
our cognitive system, instead of being restricted to reason as we claim, our hypotheses would be                               
weakened.” (2019, p.151). According to this theory, confirmation bias emerges as a                       
straightforward consequence of the function of reasoning, namely, to evaluate and produce                       
arguments effectively. For this reason, Mercier (2017) writes that “from the perspective of the                           
argumentative theory of reasoning, the myside bias should be specific to reasoning – as it seems                               
to be” (p.111), and that 
there is no evidence of a confirmation or myside bias in cognitive mechanisms besides                           
reasoning. This should not be surprising given that such a bias would be widely maladaptive. An                               
animal eager to confirm mistaken beliefs – that there are no predators around, for instance –                               
would not survive very long. (p.109) 
If, instead, confirmation bias were found outside the reasoning domain, the theory could                         
not claim to have the advantage of providing a parsimonious explanation of confirmation bias:                           
the argumentative theory does not explain how confirmation bias could have evolved outside the                           
reasoning domain. Parsimony would dictate that we should prefer a theory with a single                           
evolutionary story for confirmation bias both within and outside the reasoning domain.  
Second, Mercier & Sperber (2011) take the very existence of confirmation bias in the                           
reasoning domain as evidence that reasoning evolved primarily for social, argumentative                     
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 purposes. As such, finding confirmation bias outside the reasoning domain would additionally                       
suggest that the evolution of confirmation bias occurred relatively independently from the                       
evolution of reasoning. This independence in turn would mean that one cannot interpret the                           
existence of a confirmation bias as evidence that argumentation is the function of reasoning.                           
That is, the existence of a confirmation bias, in and of itself, would not tell us much about the                                     
evolutionary function of reasoning. 
In this article, we argue that there is ample evidence of confirmation bias outside the                             
reasoning domain. ​We present the relevant evidence, and then explain why having such                         
confirmation bias may not be maladaptive. Finally, we answer potential objections. To end on a                             
positive note, we emphasize that the presence of confirmation bias outside the reasoning domain                           
could pave the way for significant experimental progress for research on confirmation bias in                           
general. 
 
Confirmation bias outside the reasoning domain 
The best evidence against the argumentative theory would come from evidence that                       
confirmation bias exists (a) in at least one non-reasoning domain, and (b) in animals other than                               
humans. We argue that both of these possibilities are well established in the literature. 
 
Confirmation bias in perception 
You are driving down a foggy road at night. There is a vague shape up ahead in the distance.                                     
Having decided that the object is a deer, and not a car or tree, your visual system is then tasked                                       
with judging other properties of the object: its trajectory, speed, and so on. These types of                               
subsequent perceptual decisions have been shown to exhibit confirmation bias. The perceived                       
speed of the object is ​biased​, or conditioned on the decision that the object is a deer, and not a                                       
car. 
One early study by Stocker & Simoncelli (2008) demonstrated this effect using simple                         
dot-motion perception in humans, following an experiment by Jazayeri & Movshon (2007; see                         
also Zamboni et al., 2016). Observers viewed random dot motion kinematograms (RDKs) on a                           
computer screen. Some percentage of the dots moved coherently in one direction, either                         
clockwise (up and to the right) of a marker, or counterclockwise (up and to the left) of the                                   
marker (Figure 1a), while the other dots moved randomly. On 30% of the trials, after indicating                               
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 their decision about whether the net motion of the dots was clockwise or counterclockwise of                             
the marker, observers estimated the actual angle of the perceived motion flow (i.e., how much                             
clockwise or counterclockwise it appeared, relative to the marker; Figure 1b). The results indicate                           
that motion estimates are biased ​away from the reference point: the angle of the motion that                               
participants report perceiving had a larger magnitude than the actual motion direction angle. 
One explanation of this effect is that the subjects’ estimates of motion direction depend                           
on their prior perceptual decision, namely, whether they decided that the dots are moving                           
clockwise or counterclockwise of the marker. Having decided that the dots are moving clockwise                           
of the marker, the perceptual system evaluates the ​magnitude of this motion by evaluating the                             
motion of the dots that conform with the decision, while ignoring any motion inconsistent with                             
the decision (but see Fritsche & de Lange, 2019, for an alternative view). Consistent with this                               
interpretation, the results were most successfully modeled with a Bayesian observer which                       
essentially resets the probability of the ​un​chosen motion category to zero after the choice . That                             1
is, observers begin by making a motion decision (clockwise or counterclockwise), and then infer                           
the exact direction of this motion ​conditioned on their initial decision. As a result, the estimates are                                 
pushed away from the decision boundary and observers display a confirmation bias: they                         
overweight motion information supporting their categorical choice. 
 
Figure 1. Dot-motion discrimination and motion estimation task used by Jazayeri &                       
Movshon (2007) and referenced by Stocker & Simoncelli (2008). (A) Subjects see random                         
dot kinematograms of semi-coherent motion moving up and to the right (clockwise; CW) or                           
up and to the left (counterclockwise; CCW) of a boundary marker, and judge whether the                             
1 While observers are optimal on the discrimination task, they are suboptimal on the subsequent motion                               
estimation task. In that sense, it is justified to talk of a ​bias for this latter task, because the participants’                                       
behaviors systematically derive from optimality. 
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 primary motion direction is CW or CCW. (B) On some trials, after the discrimination                           
decision, subjects estimate the direction of motion flow in a continuous fashion. Figure                         
reproduced with permission from Jazayeri & Movshon (2007).  
This result was subsequently followed by more recent work on conditional perceptual                       
confirmation bias, and has been replicated in several perceptual tasks, such as line orientation                           
estimation (Luu & Stocker, 2018), estimation of the orientation of gabor patches (Fritsche & de                             
Lange, 2019) or estimation of stimulus brightness (Brezis et al., 2015). In these studies,                           
participants systematically overweight evidence in favor of their perceptual decisions when                     
estimating the magnitude of some perceptual features. That is, the perceptual systems in charge                           
of evaluating the magnitude of perceptual features seem to look primarily for information that                           
conforms with the initial categorical decisions. 
It has been recently suggested that this confirmation bias in perception may have an                           
attentional source. Using a similar task to that used by Jazayeri & Movshon (2007), Talluri and                               
colleagues (2018) developed an accumulating evidence neural network computational model                   
positing that additional signal gain is applied to stimulus features that are consistent with a given                               
perceptual choice; this was recently followed by work from Urai and colleagues (2019). In                           
essence, feedback from later-stage cognitive areas directs attention to, and thus boosts signal gain                           
on, elements of the physical stimulus that support or bolster the interpretation the system has                             
selected (see also Bronfman et al., 2015). Adaptation-like confirmation biases in sequential                       
perceptual decisions have also been reported (Abrahamyan et al., 2016). 
Although the neural mechanisms of this confirmation bias in perceptual decision making                       
remain an area of active investigation, mounting evidence suggests that these low-level,                       
automatic perceptual decisions are susceptible to confirmation bias just as observed in reasoning                         
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Festinger, 1957; Nickerson, 1998). The perceptual system seems to                         
primarily look for sensory information that conforms with its prior categorical decisions. The                         
presence of this bias outside the reasoning domain strongly suggests that the bias may stem from                               
a core information processing source in the brain rather than being unique to the argumentative                             
aspects of rational high-level cognition. 
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 Confirmation bias in perceptual confidence 
Perceptual confidence refers to the subjective sense of certainty we feel when we are making                             
perceptual decisions, and it also exhibits a well-studied confirmation bias. For example, when                         
asked to report how ​sure you feel in your decision that the object on that foggy, nighttime road is                                     
a deer, car, or tree, you overly rely on evidence supporting your perceptual decision, while                             
down-weighting evidence for other possible interpretations. Critically, confirmation bias in                   
perceptual confidence has been observed not only in humans, but in other non-human animals                           
as well. 
Over the past decade and a half, numerous studies have reported evidence for                         
confirmation bias in perceptual confidence. Zylberberg and colleagues (2012) first described that                       
in rating their confidence in dot-motion direction discrimination decisions, observers tend to                       
over-weight evidence supporting the decision that was just made. Subsequently, this observation                       
has been exploited in a number of studies to experimentally dissociate decision accuracy from                           
decision confidence by changing the contrast or other elements of the visual perceptual stimuli. 
In these studies, experimenters typically create two experimental conditions designed to                     
induce the same level of accuracy, but where one condition ought to lead to higher confidence                               
than the other. In one condition, subjects have to discriminate the identity of “high energy”                             
stimuli, for example, high contrast or high motion coherence stimuli. In the other condition, the                             
same task is performed with “low energy” stimuli, for instance, low contrast or low motion                             
coherence stimuli. Critically, in both conditions, the stimuli are matched in the signal-to-noise                         
ratio (SNR) of the internal response. That is, experimenters adjust the stimuli such that the                             
discrimination task is just as difficult for the subjects in both conditions. As a result, observers                               
have the same discrimination performance in the “high energy” and “low energy” stimuli                         
conditions (measured as task accuracy or via the signal detection theoretic metric ​d’​) (Macmillan                           
& Creelman, 2005). 
For instance, in an experiment by Koizumi et al. (2015), subjects saw stimuli consisting                           
of two superimposed sinusoidal gratings, one of which had higher contrast, tilted 45° left and                             
right of vertical (Figure 2a). On each trial, subjects had to determine the orientation of the                               
grating with higher contrast, and then rate their confidence in their decision. The stimuli could                             
take on one of four possible conditions in a 2x2 design. In the easy conditions, stimuli had high                                   
SNR as they were constituted of two superimposed gratings with very dissimilar contrasts. In the                             
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 difficult conditions, stimuli had low SNR because they were constituted by two superimposed                         
gratings with similar contrasts. Within each difficulty level, the stimuli could have either high                           
overall contrast, or low overall contrast. For instance, in the easy, low contrast condition, one                             
grating was at 25% contrast and the other at 15% contrast, but the easy, high contrast condition                                 
had a ratio of 50:30%. The corresponding hard conditions could be 25:20% (low contrast) or                             
50:40% (high contrast). Since the ​relative contrasts of the two stimuli were always preserved                           
across low contrast and high contrast conditions, the authors predicted that participants would                         
have the same performance in both conditions. 
As expected, subjects performed better in the easy compared to the hard conditions, and                             
had the same performance in the high contrast and low contrast conditions (as confirmation that                             
the SNR was matched within each difficulty level). Crucially, however, observers rated higher                         
confidence in the high contrast conditions ​even though their performance was matched across low and high                               
contrast ​conditions (Figure 2b). That is, despite nearly identical levels of performance between the                           
high and low contrast conditions within each level of difficulty, subjects felt ​more confident in                             
their decisions in the high contrast compared to the low contrast conditions. 
This effect is somewhat surprising given that one could expect subjects to rate their                           
confidence depending on the strength of the sensory evidence in favor of their decision ​relative to                               
the strength of the evidence ​against their decision (as determined by the SNR, i.e. the difficulty of                                 
the task or the subject’s accuracy on the task). This is not what happens here. Instead, observers                                 
seem to rely on the absolute strength of perceptual evidence in favor of their decision (“positive                               
evidence” as termed by Koizumi and colleagues), while tending to ignore perceptual evidence                         
against their decision, in order to compute their level of confidence. 
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Figure 2. Stimuli and results used by Koizumi et al. (2015). (A) On each trial​, ​subjects viewed                                 
a single stimulus composed of two superimposed left- or right-tilted gratings, with one                         
grating having higher contrast (“energy” or “evidence”) than the other. Four stimulus                       
variants were used: high positive evidence (“high energy”/High PE/high contrast) or low                       
positive evidence (“low energy”/Low PE/high contrast), with difficult (the two tilted                     
gratings had very different contrasts) and easy (the two tilted gratings had similar contrasts)                           
versions of each. The subjects’ task was to indicate on each trial which of the two                               
superimposed tilted gratings (i.e., the one tilted left or right of vertical) had higher contrast.                             
(B) Subjects performed better in the easy condition than the difficult condition, but there                           
was no effect of energy level (contrast level) on performance. Despite no significant                         
differences in task performance as a function of ​energy level, subjects rated significantly                         
higher confidence in the “high energy” (High PE) condition. Figure reproduced with                       
permission from Koizumi et al. (2015). 
This effect is now well confirmed in the empirical literature. Several additional                       
experiments have shown that similar experimental manipulations systematically result in matched                     
discrimination performance (e.g., the same ability to tell “left tilted grating” from “right tilted                           
grating”) but mismatched confidence (e.g., in the high contrast condition, observers report                       
feeling more confident) (Maniscalco et al. 2016; Peters et al., 2017; Samaha et al., 2016, 2017,                               
2019).  
Peters et al. (2017) even demonstrated that it is possible to directly read out this                             
confirmation bias in perceptual confidence by using machine learning techniques to decode                       
electrophysiological recordings (electrocorticography; ECoG) in awake, behaving human               
observers as they perform perceptual decisions and rate their confidence. ​Participants’ perceptual                       
decisions depended on a balance of evidence for both the chosen and unchosen alternatives as                             
decoded from the ECoG recordings, but confidence was predicted better by computational rules                         
9 
 that relied on decision-congruent (i.e., confirmatory) evidence alone. That is, when computing                       
confidence, subjects seem to primarily look for “positive evidence” that confirms their                       
categorical perceptual decisions. 
 
Confirmation bias in non-human animals 
A final strong piece of evidence that confirmation biases can occur outside the reasoning domain                             
is that the perceptual confidence confirmation bias is also observed in non-human animals –                           
which, presumably, do not reason as humans do.  
Odegaard et al. (2018) presented Rhesus macaques with a random-dot motion                     
discrimination task, in which the animals had to indicate whether coherent dot motion flowed in                             
a leftward or rightward direction. The monkeys were rewarded for correct, but not incorrect                           
decisions, and after some decisions, were also given the opportunity to “opt-out”, which                         
provided a small but guaranteed reward. Choosing to opt-out was interpreted as indicating lower                           
confidence: the monkey could have earned a higher reward if it made a decision that ended up                                 
being correct, but instead decided to opt for the small but guaranteed reward.  
In this task, Odegaard et al. manipulated confidence by varying the amount of “positive                           
evidence” (dot motion strength toward the correct choice) and “negative evidence” (dot motion                         
strength toward the incorrect choice). As anticipated, monkeys’ motion direction discrimination                     
decisions seemed to depend on the ratio of positive to negative evidence on a given trial.                               
However, whether monkeys decided to opt-out or not depended mainly on the amount of ​positive                             
evidence​. As such, by manipulating the amount of evidence in favor of the decision without                             
changing the ​ratio between positive and negative evidence, Odegaard et al. (2018) could induce                           
suboptimal confidence judgments – essentially, making the monkeys act as if they were more                           
confident or less confident irrespective of their ability to actually tell rightward versus leftward                           
motion. As with other experiments presented above, the monkeys behaved as if they were more                             
confident when the amount of positive evidence was high, and as if they were less confident                               
when the amount of positive evidence was low, despite having the same objective performance                           
in both conditions. This result is a direct replication of the confirmation bias described                           
previously in humans as shown by Koizumi et al. (2015): the magnitude of evidence supporting                             
the decision seems to overly influence confidence judgments over and above the probability that                           
the decision was correct.  
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 Stolyarova et al. (2019) even showed this confirmation bias in rats using grating stimuli                           
very much like those used by Koizumi and colleagues (2015). Rats were trained to discriminate                             
the orientation (vertical or horizontal) of Gabor patches with added Gaussian noise. Following                         
their decisions, they could either wait for a delayed sugar pellet reward if confident that their                               
decision was correct, or directly initiate a new trial to get another chance. The measure of                               
confidence is how long the rats waited for their sugar pellet: the longer they waited, the more                                 
confident it was assumed they felt, following previous literature (Lak et al., 2014; Kepecs et al.,                               
2008). In this task, ‘high positive evidence’ and ‘low positive evidence’ stimuli were created by                             
increasing or decreasing the contrast of ​both the Gabor patch and the added noise. As before,                               
since the overall ratio between signal and noise remained the same in both conditions, the rats’                               
performances did not significantly differ between the two conditions. Confidence measures, on                       
the other hand, changed significantly: despite having the same performance in both conditions,                         
the rats were willing to wait significantly longer in the high positive evidence condition,                           
compared to the low positive evidence condition. As such, it seems that even non-human                           
animals have a confirmation bias when computing levels of confidence in their perceptual                         
decisions: they disproportionately rely on ​positive sensory evidence (i.e. evidence supporting their                       
decision), and tend to ignore sensory evidence contradicting their decision.  
 
Summary 
Taken together, these results strongly suggest that the computations underlying both perception                       
and perceptual confidence are influenced by a ​positive evidence bias ​, ​i.e. an over-reliance on                           
evidence supporting one’s decision, analogous to a form of confirmation bias in these domains.                           
Perceptual decisions lead to subsequent downweighting of evidence against the decision, and an                         
increase in the absolute strength of sensory evidence ​in favor of a decision leads subjects to feel                                 
more confident, even if this increase is accompanied by a proportional increase in the evidence                             
against their decision. Following Nickerson’s influential definition of confirmation bias                   
(Nickerson, 1998), these biases should be viewed as a classic form of ​confirmation bias​: subjects are                               
interpreting ​perceptual evidence “in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a                           
hypothesis in hand” in order to compute their levels of confidence in their perceptual decisions.                             
Moreover, the fact that this confirmation bias is present in non-human animals explicitly goes                           
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 against Mercier & Sperber’s contention that “no confirmation bias emerges from studies of                         
animal behavior.” (Mercier & Sperber, 2017, p.217). 
 
Objections and replies 
We now outline three potential objections to our view that confirmation bias exists outside the                             
reasoning domain. The first objection is that reasoning could be involved in the tasks we                             
described. If so, the studies we reviewed do not demonstrate confirmation bias outside the                           
reasoning domain. The second objection is that such bias would be maladaptive, which should                           
make us suspicious that biases outside the reasoning domain could have evolved. The third                           
objection is that the kind of biases we describe are not ​genuine instances of confirmation bias. We                                 
answer these three objections in turn. 
 
Is reasoning involved in confidence confirmation bias? 
One counter-argument could be that the tasks we described do not in fact fall outside the                               
reasoning domain. According to this view, asking participants to provide confidence judgments                       
could trigger an argumentative strategy, leading participants to think – perhaps non-consciously                       
– about the reasons they had for making a particular decision. Since reasoning is biased, the                               
confirmation bias observed in confidence judgments tasks would simply derive from                     
post-perceptual reasoning, and not from the properties of the system in charge of computing                           
confidence judgments. 
This explanation is unlikely, for four main reasons. First, it does not account for the                             
same confirmation bias in non-human animals (Odegaard et al. 2018; Stolyarova et al. 2019).                           
Even if they had the required cognitive capacities, it is doubtful that non-human animals would                             
feel the need to justify their confidence judgments to the experimenters, or to themselves, by                             
engaging in reasoning. Of note, the presence of reasoning (in the sense attributed to this term by                                 
Mercier & Sperber) in non-human animals would also undermine the argumentative theory. 
Second, neurophysiological evidence suggests that the confirmation bias observed in                   
confidence judgments operates by directly biasing the rate of accumulation of evidence in early                           
sensory areas (Talluri et al. 2018; Rollwage et al. 2020). If this bias were entirely driven by                                 
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 reasoning, we should expect it to work instead through the implementation of abstract decision                           
rules outside of the sensory cortices. This is not what the empirical evidence suggests. 
Third, one prediction of the ‘reasoning’ account of confirmation bias in perceptual                       
confidence judgments is that the magnitude of bias should depend on the time that participants                             
have to provide their confidence judgments. Additional time would mean that participants can                         
generate additional reasons to convince themselves that their decisions are right, thus leading                         
them to be more biased. However, Samaha & Denison (2020) recently found the same bias in a                                 
task where participants provided confidence judgments at the same time as their perceptual                         
decisions, with a single key press, immediately after stimulus presentation. Samaha & Denison                         
(2020) interpret this finding as evidence against a post-perceptual account of confirmation bias in                           
confidence judgments; this finding using simultaneous button presses has also been replicated by                         
Maniscalco and colleagues (2020). 
Finally, this hypothesis would involve subjects performing a reasoning task on top of the                           
perceptual and confidence tasks. Given the number of trials involved in those tasks, we consider                             
it quite unlikely that participants would systematically engage in costly reasoning strategies. Why                         
would participants do this, if they can instead simply answer based on a read-out of their own                                 
confidence states? Without an independent justification, the hypothesis that participants                   
systematically engage in (possibly unconscious) reasoning, in tasks that do not require them to do                             
so, remains ​ad hoc​. 
For these reasons, we consider it unlikely that asking participants to provide confidence                         
judgments triggers argumentative strategies, which in turn account for the observed biases.                       
Instead, the confirmation bias in confidence judgments seems to stem directly from biases                         
imposed on sensory evidence accumulation during perceptual decisions.  
It is also worth noting that while we have provided numerous examples here of                           
confirmation bias in confidence judgments, there are also a number of examples of confirmation                           
bias in perception alone even when metacognition is not involved, as discussed above. The                           
presence of these suggests that even if confirmation bias in confidence could be explained away                             
as reasoning-based, it would not be possible to do so for perceptual effects (e.g., orientation                             
judgments in Jazayeri & Movshon’s (2007) and Stocker & Simoncelli’s (2008) works; see also Jin                             
et al. 2019). 
 
13 
 Why confirmation bias in the perceptual domain won’t kill you 
Proponents of the argumentative theory of reasoning have systematically argued that the                       
existence of confirmation bias outside the reasoning domain would be maladaptive. For instance,                         
Mercier & Sperber write:  
Our survival and reproduction very much depend on the quality of the information provided                           
by intuitions. (...) some specific biases may on the whole be advantageous when they lower                             
the costs of cognition or make less likely particularly costly kinds of mistake. The                           
confirmation bias carries none of these advantages. Unsurprisingly, then, no confirmation                     
bias emerges from studies of animal behavior. A mouse bent on confirming its belief that                             
there are no cats around and a rat focusing its attention on breadcrumbs and ignoring other                               
foods to confirm its belief that breadcrumbs are the best food would not pass on their genes                                 
to many descendants. (Mercier & Sperber, 2017, p.217). 
On this view, the kind of confirmation bias outside the reasoning domain we have reviewed                             
would be maladaptive, which gives rise to a puzzle: why would a wide variety of cognitive and                                 
perceptual capacities be subject to confirmation bias? 
One strong hypothesis rests on the observation that our environment is typically likely to                           
be stable across time rather than abruptly changing at any given moment (Urai et al., 2019;                               
Talluri et al., 2018; Gold & Shadlen, 2007). That is, from one moment to the next, the state of                                     
the environment is unlikely to radically change: if the water in this river is currently flowing one                                 
way, it is unlikely to suddenly start flowing in the opposite direction; if the color of the leaves is                                     
currently green, it is unlikely to suddenly become purple; and so on. In essence, it is highly likely                                   
that the state of the environment at any time point can be strongly predicted by whatever its                                 
state was only a moment prior. One hypothesis is that the brain exploits this temporal stability                               
(or temporal dependence) in its continuous evaluation of evidence. Having reached the inference                         
that ​X​ is occurring at time ​t​, a reasonable guess for what is occurring at time ​t​ + 1 is also ​X ​. 
Additionally, in deciding that ​X is currently occurring, the brain rules out a large                           
(potentially infinite) number of alternative hypotheses. It would be highly inefficient to maintain                         
the joint distribution of all possible interpretations and reevaluate incoming evidence at every                         
time point as if all previous timepoints had never occurred. Indeed, in the vast space of possible                                 
hypotheses, computing the probability of all the unchosen alternatives at every moment (not to                           
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 mention confidence in those alternatives) could occupy essentially all available neural resources                       2
–– especially if one assumes that the brain computes exact probabilistic inferences and not                           
variational (e.g. Beck et al., 2012) or sampling-based approximations (e.g. Fiser et al., 2010). 
Thus, given temporal stability of the environment, and the vast number of possible states                           
of the environment, it would be computationally efficient for a system to select one categorical                             
inference about the state of the environment and then stick to it (Stocker & Simoncelli, 2008;                               
Luu & Stocker, 2018). In the face of limited computational resources, these computational                         
properties strongly support the evolutionary utility of committing to a single high-level                       
interpretation by iteratively ​updating a stable belief about the most likely state of the world, rather                               
than continuously monitoring the probability of a very large number of unchosen alternatives. In                           
fact, Qiu et al. (2019) have recently described how such a strategy appears mathematically                           
optimal rather than suboptimal, suggesting that confirmation bias – even outside the reasoning                         
domain – is not only not maladaptive but actually evolutionarily desirable (Qiu et al., 2019). 
 
If ​this​ is not confirmation bias outside of the reasoning domain, what could be? 
Another objection to our claim that confirmation bias exists outside the reasoning domain could                           
be that what we have described above is not ​really a kind of confirmation bias. That is, scientists                                   
studying “confirmation bias” in the domains of perception, or confidence, are not studying a                           
genuine kind of confirmation bias, but an altogether different phenomenon. We have two                         
responses to this objection. 
First, these phenomena do demonstrate a ​bias in the sense that the participants’ behaviors                           
are suboptimal (Rahnev & Denison, 2018). Optimal bayesian models cast confidence as a                         
readout of the probability of being correct (e.g. Kepecs et al. 2008). On the contrary, in the                                 
studies we presented, the participants’ confidence judgments are ​suboptimal ​. Participants rely                     
more heavily on evidence supporting their decisions than evidence against their decisions, which                         
leads them to systematically derive from optimality (Rahnev & Denison, 2018; see also Li & Ma,                               
2020). 
Following others (Talluri et al. 2018; Rollwage et al. 2020), we hold that this bias is a                                 
confirmation bias, because it fits standard definitions of this phenomenon: participants are                       
2 This is true especially if one assumes the brain computes confidence after a decision has been reached 
(Pouget et al., 2016). 
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 suboptimal because they – or rather their perceptual systems – “look for” evidence supporting                           
their perceptual decisions, and neglect evidence against those decisions. The effects we reviewed                         
are also consistent with Nickerson’s (1998) definition of confirmation bias: “the seeking or                         
interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis                             
in hand” (Nickerson, 1998), which is used by Mercier & Sperber themselves (2011, p.63). 
Indeed, we have argued that, when making perceptual judgments such as estimating the                         
motion of dots relative to a reference point (Stocker & Simoncelli, 2008), subjects have a bias                               
towards making judgments that are “partial” to their existing perceptual beliefs (Brezis et al.,                           
2015; Jazayeri & Movshon, 2007; Fritsche & de Lange, 2019; Luu & Stocker, 2018; Zamboni et                               
al., 2016). In the same way, extensive data suggests that, when computing confidence judgments,                           
subjects overly rely on sensory evidence in favor of their perceptual decisions, and neglect                           
contradictory sensory evidence (Peters et al., 2017; Zylberberg et al., 2012; Samaha et al., 2016;                             
2017; 2019; Maniscalco et al., 2016).  
Again, these effects seem consistent with the standard definition of confirmation bias, in                         
that they demonstrate a systematic overweighting of evidence ​in favor of choices, beliefs, or                           
hypotheses held by the subjects, relative to the weight given to evidence against those choices,                             
beliefs, or hypotheses. That is, once a decision is made, the cognitive systems computing                           
confidence “look for” evidence confirming the decision, while ignoring evidence that contradicts                       
it. Given that these effects fit standard definitions of confirmation bias – which are accepted by                               
proponents of the argumentative theory of reasoning too – we hold that it is natural to consider                                 
them as instances of confirmation bias, as others have done (Talluri et al. 2018; Rollwage et al.                                 
2020). 
Second, if the various effects we have presented ​do not count as confirmation bias outside                             
the reasoning domain, one might wonder what could ever count as demonstrating such bias. In                             
other words, it is not clear what “confirmation bias outside the reasoning domain” could mean,                             
if not to denote precisely the type of effects we have just presented, namely, the systematic                               
overweighting of information in favor of the participants’ (perceptual) decisions, and relative                       
neglect of contradictory information.  
On the other hand, if Mercier & Sperber (2011, 2017) implicitly define ‘confirmation                         
bias’ – or ‘myside bias’ – such that it applies only to the reasoning domain, their prediction                                 
would reveal itself as a moot point. If proponents of the argumentative theory of reasoning have                               
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 a different definition of ‘myside bias’ in mind, the burden of proof is on them to provide it and                                     
justify it. They would also need to show that their definition does not ​directly rule out the                                 
possibility of myside bias outside the reasoning domain. For otherwise, they would simply beg                           
the question. To be meaningful, their definition of ‘confirmation bias’ should leave the possibility                           
of discovering this bias outside the reasoning domain open. To the extent that this possibility is                               
not ruled out as a matter of definition, we hold that the effects reviewed in this article                                 
demonstrate that confirmation bias ​does exist outside the reasoning domain, thus contradicting                       
the argumentative theory of reasoning. 
 
Conclusion 
The recognition of confirmation bias outside the reasoning domain could spark a revolution in                           
the way in which confirmation bias is studied. Indeed, the simple psychophysical paradigms and                           
stimuli used to study confirmation bias in the perceptual domain are ideally suited for realizing a                               
wide variety of experimental manipulations. Using methods borrowed from psychophysics to                     
study confirmation bias allows us to exactly manipulate the amount of evidence that subjects are                             
exposed to, and measure the subjects’ ability to integrate contradictory evidence. Several                       
preliminary studies have shown promise in linking perceptual and cognitive confirmation biases,                       
suggesting that studying confirmation in the perceptual domain may provide a fruitful avenue for                           
eventually characterizing the source and nature of confirmation bias (e.g., Rollwage et al., 2018).                           
Such ​a ​level of precision is currently impossible to reach in the study of confirmation bias in the                                   
reasoning domain, thus preventing a careful study of the neural and computational sources of                           
such biases. Future research seeking to reveal correlations between confirmation bias in the                         
perceptual and reasoning domains may reveal whether unique, parallel mechanisms give rise to                         
each individually, or if a single source can drive and explain both together. 
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